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ANALYSIS

A remote bridge shows how US-Iran war is expanding

Umud Shokri
Umud Shokri

Senior visiting fellow, George Mason University

Jul 10, 2026, 01:28 GMT+1
An image related by Iranian media purportedly showing the damage to the Aq Takeh Khan bridge in northeastern Iran, July 9, 2026
An image related by Iranian media purportedly showing the damage to the Aq Takeh Khan bridge in northeastern Iran, July 9, 2026

A reported US strike on a railway bridge in northern Iran has drawn attention to a lesser-known front in the widening conflict: the battle over the transport corridors linking Iran to Central Asia, Russia and China.

Iranian state media and the IRGC said cruise missiles attributed to US forces struck the Aq Tekeh Khan railway bridge near Aqqala in Golestan province early Wednesday, damaging the Gorgan–Incheh Borun railway line.

Washington has not confirmed the strike, and the claim has not been independently verified.

The bridge is part of Iran’s northern rail connectivity with Turkmenistan and wider Central Asian networks, making it relevant to military logistics, civilian trade, sanctions resilience and alternative transit routes.

Its targeting, if confirmed, would suggest that transport nodes are becoming strategic assets in the widening conflict, where pressure on dual-use infrastructure can disrupt connectivity without focusing only on conventional military sites.

Why the bridge matters

The Aq Tekeh Khan Bridge lies on the Gorgan–Incheh Borun railway, a key segment linking Iran’s interior to its northeastern border with Turkmenistan.

Incheh Borun serves as an important rail crossing and dry port in Golestan province, connecting southward into Iran’s national railway network and northward into the Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran corridor inaugurated in 2014.

The corridor, stretching from Kazakhstan through Turkmenistan into Iran, provides an overland connection between Iran and Central Asia, with links to Russia, China and wider Eurasian markets.

It also complements the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and overlaps with China’s Belt and Road Initiative ambitions by offering alternatives to vulnerable maritime routes.

For Iran, this northern railway artery is strategically valuable because it expands access to resource-rich Central Asian states and supports transit flows less exposed to Gulf chokepoints.

Freight trains from China have also moved along related corridors, underscoring the route’s place in broader East-West Eurasian trade.

Battle of transport networks

If confirmed, targeting railway infrastructure would suggest a broadening of strike objectives beyond traditional military facilities.

Railway bridges such as Aq Tekeh Khan are dual-use assets: they support civilian commerce, military mobility, sanctions-evading trade and rapid wartime logistics.

In modern conflicts, from Ukraine to the Middle East, infrastructure warfare has become increasingly central. Railways, ports, pipelines, bridges and power grids serve as chokepoints where military pressure and economic disruption intersect.

A damaged bridge can force rerouting, increase transport costs, delay supply chains and create bottlenecks whose effects exceed the physical scale of the strike itself.

For Iran, already facing pressure on southern ports, energy infrastructure and Gulf-facing trade routes, disruption to northern rail connectivity would test the resilience of its overland alternatives.

Targeting sanctions lifelines?

Damage to the Aq Tekeh Khan Bridge and associated rail services could limit Iran’s ability to move goods, fuel, equipment and strategic materials along its northern corridor.

Iranian authorities said the damage was repaired within a day and rail traffic had resumed, a claim that could not be independently verified. Even if temporary, the disruption highlights the importance of repair speed and infrastructure resilience in a conflict increasingly focused on transport networks.

Northern rail connectivity becomes especially important when southern ports or the Strait of Hormuz face military or political pressure. In such conditions, Iran’s ability to maintain alternative land routes through Central Asia, the Caspian region and Russia becomes part of its wider strategic depth.

Iran has spent years developing land corridors with Central Asia, Russia, China and the Caspian region to reduce dependence on maritime routes exposed to sanctions, surveillance and possible interdiction.

The Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran railway and INSTC-linked routes are central to that strategy, enabling transit revenues, regional trade and access to markets where sanctions enforcement may be less direct.

Strikes on such infrastructure could therefore be intended to erode Iran’s sanctions resilience by raising operational risks for partners and discouraging use of Iranian corridors during periods of conflict.

Regional consequences

The reported strike also carries potential implications for Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states.

These countries have invested in diversified transit routes through Iran to reach Gulf ports and global markets while reducing dependence on Russian or Chinese-controlled corridors.

If Iranian routes are viewed as vulnerable during conflict, governments and commercial operators may reassess their reliability.

For China, disruption to Iranian-linked corridors adds uncertainty to longer supply chains connecting East Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.

For Russia, which has deepened logistical ties with Tehran, damage to Iranian transport infrastructure could complicate southern access routes.

The reported strike highlights how infrastructure has become part of modern strategic competition.

For Iran, the incident reinforces the challenge of protecting trade networks built to withstand sanctions and pressure on maritime access. It also shows that corridor politics, from the BRI to the INSTC, are increasingly shaped not only by commerce but by military risks.

Whether this leads to hardened infrastructure, shifts in regional trade planning or renewed pressure for de-escalation remains uncertain, but the bridge’s symbolic and practical importance now extends well beyond Golestan province.

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US strikes, Hormuz clashes push Iran deal to brink

Jul 9, 2026, 21:43 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
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A US fighter jet on board a US warship in this CENTCOM handout

The fragile memorandum between Tehran and Washington is facing its biggest test yet after two days of US strikes on targets along Iran’s southern coast and Iranian attacks on commercial shipping near the Strait of Hormuz raised fears of a return to full-scale war.

Iranian officials have threatened severe retaliation, while analysts warn that disputes over sanctions, maritime routes and the future of the agreement could push both sides into another major confrontation.

Mohsen Jalilvand, a professor of international relations, said the continued US military presence in the region and Tehran's insistence on controlling shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have significantly increased the risk of war.

"When both sides continue to stand by their positions, and there are no signs of retreat, it is only natural that the likelihood of a broader confrontation increases," he told the news website Fararu.

"Overall, I see the outlook moving less toward an agreement and more toward escalating tensions and a greater possibility of a major conflict."

‘Abandon MoU’

Senior officials and hardline media reacted angrily after the latest US attacks, which the Iranian Health Ministry said killed 14 people and injured 78 others. Several senior figures demanded tougher retaliation or called for formally abandoning the memorandum with Washington.

Parliament Speaker and Iran's chief negotiator Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf wrote on X that "America still has not learned that bullying and breaking its commitments no longer come without a cost."

"Let me be clear: if you strike, you will be struck. Stop struggling in vain—you will only sink deeper. The Strait of Hormuz will be reopened only under Iranian arrangements, not American threats."

Alaeddin Boroujerdi, a member of parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, told state broadcaster IRIB that Iran's response would be "more severe" and warned that continued confrontation would ultimately harm the United States.

The hardline Kayhan newspaper argued that repeated US attacks, the revocation of Iran's oil export waiver and what it described as violations of the agreed shipping arrangements in Hormuz had rendered the agreement meaningless.

"When Iran's armed forces tighten their grip on the world's energy artery in the Strait of Hormuz and play the Bab al-Mandab card, the West's economic lifeline will be cut, and Trump will beg for a ceasefire more desperately than ever," the newspaper wrote.

Kayhan urged the Foreign Ministry to formally declare the memorandum void so the armed forces could "settle Trump's account once and for all."

Tensions with Oman

The latest escalation followed Iranian attacks on vessels using a route south of the Strait of Hormuz, on the Omani side, while under US naval escort rather than the shipping corridor designated by Tehran.

Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi accused Washington of pressuring Oman to open an alternative southern shipping lane despite what he said was an agreement that Iran would regulate maritime traffic during the memorandum's 60-day implementation period.

"From our perspective, America's insistence on creating a parallel route disrupted implementation of the memorandum," Gharibabadi said. “The Revolutionary Guards' response was entirely lawful and legitimate."

Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters warned that any party providing military support for US attacks on Iran would constitute a legitimate target.

“The only safe shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz is the one designated by the Islamic Republic," the statement said.

Oman, however, told the International Maritime Organization on Thursday that it opposed the imposition of transit charges on ships using the strait and reiterated that "the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation is guaranteed under international law."

Gharibabadi said Iranian officials had informed Omani and Qatari authorities—and indirectly Washington—that the southern route was "completely illegal," violated Clause 5 of the memorandum and "must be closed."

Public exhaustion

Although Tehran and most major Iranian cities have not been targeted since the ceasefire, apart from areas along the southern coastline, the renewed fighting has had an immediate economic impact.

The Iranian rial weakened sharply on Thursday, with the US dollar rising from about 1.6 million rials to more than 1.8 million rials. According to the Central Bank of Iran's latest figures, point-to-point inflation has reached nearly 83 percent.

Despite growing fears of renewed conflict, many Iranians appear more subdued than during previous crises after experiencing two wars within a year. Online discussions suggest widespread exhaustion and emotional numbness rather than panic.

"Is it just my algorithm, or does nobody actually care that the war has started again?" one X user wrote.

Another user, Sina, wrote: "Do we really have to hear fighter jets and explosions over Tehran before we believe the war has resumed?"

A third user commented: "Iranian cities were bombed last night. That means we're officially at war. But our minds are so exhausted, and we've suffered so much, that we're collectively choosing denial."

A reader commenting on Khabar Online wrote: "I just came to say we're exhausted. By God, we're exhausted. How much more tension and pressure can we take? Are you really going to bring another war down on our heads?”

Iran uses Khamenei funeral in Iraq to claim regional reach

Jul 9, 2026, 11:28 GMT+1
•
Maryam Sinaiee
100%
Clerics wait for the arrival of the coffin of Iran's late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf, Iraq, July 8, 2026.

The Islamic Republic sought to turn Ali Khamenei’s funeral ceremonies in Iraq into a regional show of loyalty, using processions in Najaf and Karbala to suggest that his authority reached beyond Iran even as Tehran’s allied network faces growing pressure.

After funeral processions in Tehran and Qom, the coffins of Khamenei and several members of his family, who were killed in the February 28 US-Israeli attack, were taken on Tuesday to Najaf, home to the shrine of Imam Ali, one of the holiest sites in Shiite Islam.

They were transferred on Wednesday to Karbala, home to the shrine of Imam Hussein. Both cities carry deep religious symbolism for Shiites, especially in narratives of martyrdom, sacrifice and political defiance.

Political analyst Iman Aghayari told Iran International that the Islamic Republic was using the ceremonies to present Khamenei’s influence as extending beyond Iran’s borders.

He said Tehran also wanted to signal to Western governments that its influence in countries hosting allied armed groups “is not confined to those proxy forces, but is rooted among the people of those countries as well.”

A funeral staged across Shiite centers

A number of current and former Iraqi officials, including Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, along with Shiite and Sunni political, military and religious figures, welcomed the funeral delegation at Najaf airport.

The delegation was led by Khamenei’s eldest son, Mostafa Khamenei, and accompanied by President Masoud Pezeshkian, who cut short his visit and returned to Tehran early Wednesday following renewed US military strikes.

The Iraqi government declared Wednesday a public holiday to facilitate attendance and organized transportation for mourners traveling to Najaf and Karbala.

Iranian state media, citing Iraqi officials and the Popular Mobilization Forces, said more than two million people attended the ceremony in Najaf, while participation in Karbala was reported to be more than double that number.

The figures could not be independently verified.

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People attend a funeral procession for Iran's slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei during a funeral procession in Karbala, Iraq, July 9, 2026.

A claimed display of strength

Supporters of the Islamic Republic portrayed the ceremonies as proof of regional solidarity behind the so-called Axis of Resistance, Tehran’s network of allied governments, militias and political movements across the Middle East.

Esmail Qaani, commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, said the funeral procession in Iraq would “make the red line of vengeance more prominent” and “further strengthen the united resolve of the Iraqi and Iranian peoples against American conspiracies.”

Defa Press, a news agency affiliated with Iran’s armed forces, described the ceremonies as “a transnational display of the Axis of Resistance’s power and confidence,” saying they showed political unity between Iran and Iraq.

Writing for the IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency, political commentator Aghil Emami argued that the funeral proved the two nations’ loyalty to “shared ideals and the transnational leadership of the Islamic Revolution.”

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People attend a funeral procession for Iran's late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf, Iraq, July 8, 2026.

Religious symbolism and political messaging

Holding funeral ceremonies in Iraq – home to one of the world’s largest Shiite populations after Iran – carried both religious and political value for the Islamic Republic.

Iranian state media and some Iraqi Shiite politicians and outlets framed the processions through the language of Imam Hussein’s martyrdom, presenting Shiites as a unified political community confronting what they called “American arrogance” across the region.

For Tehran, the symbolism was especially important after Khamenei’s death and amid uncertainty over the future of its regional network.

The ceremonies allowed Iranian officials and supporters to link Khamenei’s legacy to the shrines of Najaf and Karbala, while also trying to reinforce the religious legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and of his successor.

The hardline X account Rah-e Deylami argued that Iraq, once Iran’s wartime enemy in the 1980s, had become “one of the pillars of the Axis of Resistance thanks to the blood of the martyred leader” and his policies.

It also pointed to mourners carrying photographs of Mojtaba Khamenei, saying the funeral had become “a ceremony of allegiance to his worthy successor” and that “Khamenei’s Iraqi followers have come to declare that they will continue this path.”

Such claims are difficult to measure against actual public sentiment in Iraq, where attitudes toward Iran and Iran-backed groups have long been mixed and politically contested.

Hamas gives up Gaza government, but not Iran ties

Jul 8, 2026, 16:05 GMT+1
•
Negar Mojtahedi
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A senior Hamas official meets Iran's parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on the sidelines of the funeral ceremonies for slain supreme leader Ali Khamenei, July 4, 2026

Hamas says it is stepping away from governing Gaza. But is it actually giving up power or turning away from its longtime backers in Tehran?

The group’s announcement that it is dissolving the governing body that administered Gaza for nearly two decades has been presented as a significant political concession under a US-backed roadmap for the enclave’s future.

But analysts who spoke to Iran International say the move is largely cosmetic, leaving Hamas’s military structure intact and doing little to alter its long-standing relationship with Iran.

Rather than abandoning Hamas, Iran has simply shifted its priorities, they argue, placing Hezbollah and Lebanon ahead of Gaza while quietly maintaining ties with the group.

"It's not even symbolic, it's a lie," said Beni Sabti, an Iran researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). "The real thing is not even the disarmament. The ideology is still there."

The announcement dissolves Hamas’s civilian governing body, but leaves unanswered whether the group is willing to surrender its weapons and relinquish control over Gaza’s security apparatus.

For Sabti, that omission is the entire story.

"Iran is acting behind the curtains, also for Hamas," he said.

Recent developments suggest the relationship remains active despite Tehran’s muted public rhetoric.

Before the Iran-US memorandum was signed, a Hamas military spokesman said Iranian officials had pledged to help secure a ceasefire in Gaza.

Hamas representatives also traveled to Tehran for Ali Khamenei’s funeral, where they met senior Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

To Sabti, those contacts suggest Tehran has not changed its long-term strategy. Instead, it has temporarily reordered its priorities.

"Hezbollah is the most important," he said, arguing Iran has historically never abandoned its proxy groups.

The timing of Hamas’s announcement also reflects mounting pressure on the group.

It comes amid a US-backed political process for Gaza’s future, sustained pressure from Egypt and Qatar, renewed political competition from Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and growing anti-Hamas protests inside Gaza itself.

Dalia Ziada, a Middle East analyst with ISGAP, argues Hamas’s announcement was designed to respond to those pressures without making the one concession demanded by Israel and much of the international community.

"They were forced to say something, not to do something," she said.

According to Ziada, Hamas has not agreed to disarm, dismantle its military wing or remove the network of loyalists embedded throughout Gaza’s civilian institutions.

"The international community is dealing with Hamas as a political entity," she said. "But no. This is a terrorist militia."

Ziada believes Tehran’s current restraint reflects pragmatism rather than a strategic break.

"Hamas is not profitable anymore," she said, arguing the group has become more of a liability than an asset following Israel’s campaign against its leadership. "If Hamas survives this situation... of course Iran will snap back."

Former Israeli intelligence official Avi Melamed agrees Hamas’s announcement should not be mistaken for a genuine transfer of power.

"I don't think that anyone really takes it seriously," he said.

Melamed argues Iran views Hamas primarily as a strategic instrument rather than an ideological partner.

"The relationship has been always clear. Hamas is a useful servant for the Iranian regime."

For Tehran, he says, Hezbollah remains the crown jewel of its regional network, while Hamas occupies a lower place in what he describes as the "food chain."

"Hamas and Islamic Jihad know their place in the food chain," Melamed said.

That hierarchy helps explain why Lebanon featured prominently in the Iran-US memorandum while Gaza did not.

The announcement may ease diplomatic pressure and create space for negotiations over Gaza’s future. But without disarmament, analysts argue, it changes little about the balance of power on the ground.

Hamas may be stepping away from civilian administration. Its military structure remains intact. And despite Tehran’s public silence, few expect Iran’s relationship with Hamas to disappear.