International affairs and Internet freedom expert
Iran’s near-total internet blackout since January 8 did not only shut down social media but collapsed the country’s last channels to the outside world, isolating families and sharply limiting what evidence of the crackdown could escape.
The shutdown, imposed on January 8 as protests spread nationwide, follows a familiar pattern in the Islamic Republic’s response to unrest. But its scale and duration have once again exposed a critical vulnerability for both Iranians and the outside world: when domestic networks go dark, how does information still get out?
The answer lies in a narrow and increasingly contested ecosystem of satellite-based and offline technologies that operate beyond Iran’s communications infrastructure.
Among the actors working in that space is NetFreedom Pioneers (NFP), a US-based nonprofit that has spent more than a decade developing tools for societies living under digital repression.
“People in Iran are asking for basic freedoms and basic livelihoods, and they are facing live fire,” said Evan Firoozi, NFP’s executive director. “The question is whether the outside world can still see what is happening.”
Founded in Los Angeles in 2012, NFP initially focused on countering Iran’s expanding censorship regime.
Its best-known technology, Toosheh, is a one-way satellite file-casting system that delivers information using widely available household equipment: free-to-air satellite dishes, receivers and USB drives. Because it does not rely on internet connectivity, Toosheh can continue operating even during nationwide shutdowns.
Over the years, the system has been used to distribute global news, digital security guidance and educational material inside Iran. During periods of unrest, NFP says it adjusts the content it sends, prioritizing personal safety information and verified reporting.
After a five-month pause linked to US funding disruptions, Toosheh resumed broadcasts in January as the blackout took hold.
Two-way communication is far harder to sustain. That gap has increasingly been filled by Starlink, the satellite internet service operated by SpaceX.
NFP is supporting Starlink access for Iranians, delivering terminals and covering subscription costs–that is, until Elon Musk lifted subscription fees for users in Iran–thanks to public's donations.
During the 2022 Women, Life, Freedom protests, NFP began helping deliver Starlink terminals into Iran, enabling limited but crucial connectivity for activists, journalists and civil-society networks.
“Without satellite internet, much of what the world sees from Iran simply wouldn’t exist,” said Mehdi Yahyanejad, an NFP co-founder and board member. “Most of the photos and videos that do emerge during shutdowns are transmitted through Starlink.”
The number of Starlink terminals inside Iran is impossible to verify. Activists estimate that tens of thousands may be scattered across the country, smuggled in via third countries and used not only by political groups but also by businesses, students and households seeking uncensored access.
Countermeasures
Iranian authorities have acknowledged the threat posed by such systems, and users report intermittent jamming, reportedly using Russian-supplied technology.
This week, monitoring groups including NetBlocks and Access Now reported brief, inconsistent openings in Iran’s shutdown, allowing limited messaging and data access.
The restrictions, however, remain largely in place, leaving satellite systems, one-way tools like Toosheh and trusted circumvention software as the primary lifelines for both Iranians and those trying to document events from abroad.
Groups working in this space have relied in part on public fundraising to finance satellite terminals and subscriptions, drawing support from the Iranian diaspora and technology donors.
For now, Iranians are forced to rely on a fragile patchwork: shared Starlink terminals switched on briefly to avoid detection, one-way satellite systems like Toosheh, and circumvention tools that work only intermittently.
It is enough to let fragments escape, but not enough to guarantee sustained, safe communication for millions living under blackout conditions.
New satellite technologies, including Direct-to-Cell services that allow ordinary mobile phones to connect directly to satellites without ground infrastructure, could fundamentally alter the balance.
Yet for Iranians, these services remain out of reach, constrained by sanctions, licensing barriers and political hesitation, even as the blackout model becomes an increasingly central tool of repression.
Until that changes, the outside world’s view into Iran will continue to depend on a narrow group of actors willing to take extraordinary risks to keep information moving.
Their work does not end repression, but it prevents it from disappearing entirely into darkness—and in moments like this, that distinction matters.
